Abstract. Often a set of imperatives or norms seems satisfiable from the outset, but conflicts arise when ways to fulfill all are ruled out by unfortunate circumstances. Semantic methods to handle normative conflicts were devised by B. van Fraassen and J. F. Horty, but these are not sensitive to circumstances. The present paper extends these resolution mechanisms to circumstantial inputs, defines dyadic deontic operators accordingly, and provides a sound and (weakly) complete axiomatic system for such deontic semantics.
The Question of Normative Conflicts
Do moral conflicts exist? The orthodox belief in the 1950's was that such conflicts only exist at first glance -the seemingly conflicting obligations arising from the application of merely incomplete principles. Instead, what is actually obligatory must be determined by a careful moral deliberation that involves considering and weighing all relevant facts and reasons, and cannot produce conflicting outcomes. Among the first that came to reject this view were E. J. Lemmon [27] and B. Williams [43] : Lemmon observed that in cases of true moral dilemma, one does not know the very facts needed to determine which obligation might outweigh the other. Williams argued in reductio that if, in case of conflicting oughts, there is just one thing one 'actually' ought to do, then feelings of regret about having not acted as one should have are out of place and one should not mind getting into similar situations again. To avoid the derivation of the ought of a contradiction from two oughts of equal weight but with contradictory contents, Williams argued that deontic logic should give up the agglomeration principle
(C) OA ∧ OB → O(A ∧ B).
Lemmon had no such qualms: he advocated dropping the Kantian Principle 'ought implies can' (KP) OA → A, thus allowing for obligations to bring about the impossible, and concluded:
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"I should like to see a proper discussion of the arguments that go to resolve moral dilemmas, because I do not believe that this is an area of total irrationality, though I do not believe that a traditional logical approach (the logic of imperatives, deontic logic, and whatnot) will do either."
Regarding commands and legal norms, G.H. von Wright ( [45] ch.7), like H. Kelsen ([23] p.211) at the time, excluded the coexistence of conflicting norms from the same source: The giving of two conflicting norms is the expression of an irrational will; it is a performative self-contradiction and as such a pure fact that fails to create a norm. E. Stenius [40] and later C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin [1] rejected this view: A system of norms that is impossible to obey might be unreasonable and its norm-giver blameworthy, but its existence does not constitute a logical contradiction -conflicts are ubiquitous in systems of positive law and logic cannot deny this fact. In his later theory, von Wright [49] concedes that existing normative systems may or may not be contradiction-free, and reformulates deontic principles as meta-norms for consistent norm-giving. Kelsen [24] later came to view logic as inapplicable to law.
Van Fraassen's Proposal and Horty's Variation

Van Fraassen's Operator O
F
Not taking sides, pro or contra the existence of genuine normative conflicts, but arguing that the view in favor seems at least tenable, B. van Fraassen [11] took up the burden of finding plausible logical semantics that could accommodate conflicting obligations. The intended semantics should accept the possible truth of two deontic sentences OA, O¬A without committing the norm-subject to the absurd by making O(A ∧ ¬A) true, for van Fraassen wanted to keep the Kantian Principle. Given the existence of certain imperatives in force, i.e. imperatives that are left as valid, relevant, not overridden etc. by some unspecified deliberation process, van Fraassen's idea was to make these imperatives part of the logical model, and to describe something as obligatory if it serves to satisfy some, not necessarily all, imperatives. Formally, let I be the set of imperatives in force, B be the set of possible states of affairs, and i + ⊆ B be the possible states of affairs where the imperative i ∈ I is considered fulfilled. Let A ⊆ B be the set of possible states of affairs where the indicative sentence A is considered true. So A is obligatory if and only if (iff) there is some score that can be achieved when A is true, which is not included in any score that could be achieved when ¬A is true. In other words, A is obligatory iff there are imperatives that can only be (collectively) satisfied when A is true, but not when A is false.
By slightly changing the viewpoint, van Fraassen's proposal might also be described in the following way: let I be a set not of imperatives, but of indicative sentences in the language L BL of some basic logic BL. The motivation is that I contains one sentence A for each imperative i in force that is true in exactly those states of affairs in which the imperative is fulfilled, i.e. A = i + . BL is assumed to be compact and the turnstile in Γ BL A means a classical consequence relation that characterizes BL, Γ ⊆ L BL , A ∈ L BL . Let the remainder set Γ ⊥ A be the set of all maximal subsets that do not derive A, i.e. of all Γ ⊆ Γ such that (i) Γ BL A, and (ii) there is no Γ such that Γ ⊂ Γ ⊆ Γ and Γ A. Then Df-F is equivalent to Df-F * ( means an arbitrary tautology):
So A is obligatory iff it is derivable from a maximally consistent subset of I. So something is obligatory if it is required for doing 'the most': if it is necessitated by a strategy to fulfill so many imperatives that no one who satisfies these as well could satisfy more. While a parallel operation for belief change is known as 'credulous reasoning', to call it 'orthodox' might seem more appropriate: the agent is not released from any of her obligations as long as they are An axiomatic system DL F that is (weakly) complete with regard to van Fraassen's semantics is defined by the following axiom-schemes, in addition to BL-instances and modus ponens (cf. [17] sec. 5, ⊥ means an arbitrary contradiction, and the index 'F ' here and below indicates that the deontic operators occurring in the axiom scheme are thus indexed): 
So not even the obligatory is always permitted, which seems strange (cf. Jacquette [22] ).
In reaction to the dismissal of the agglomeration principle, Donagan [8] and Brink [7] have claimed that even if there could be a normative demand for A and a conflicting demand for B, with BL A → ¬B, it need not follow that the norm-subject has an obligation to realize A and an obligation to realize B. Rather, there should just be a disjunctive obligation to realize A or B. Given competing normative standards of equal weight, the strategy of this reasoning is not to trust a single standard, but to consider obligatory only what all standards demand. Let I be as before. Varying van Fraassen's truth definition, Horty [20] has formalized this 'skeptical' ought as follows:
So O S A is true iff A is derivable from all maximally consistent subsets of I. 'skeptical' is the term used in the epistemic-oriented literature, yet 'legalist' also seems fitting, since a norm violation is never pronounced as obligatory even if it is inevitable. This does not let the agent off the hook: by doing what is obligatory in this sense, a maximum of norms will, by necessity, get satisfied. 
is valid, and the mixed system DL {F,S} -containing the axiom schemes for DL F , DL S , the axiom scheme (C SF ), all instances of BL-theorems and modus ponens -is sound and (weakly) complete (cf. [17] sec. 6).
'consistent aggregation' must take place before weakening. For the present imperative semantics, I suggested a bimodal approach in [17] with an operator O 2 that 'more directly talks about the imperatives'. For comparisons and a new proposal cf. [15] . 3 More in parallel to van Fraassen's original definition, one may equivalently define:
Predicaments and Dyadic Deontic Logic
Arguing for the possibility of moral conflicts, R. Barcan Marcus [33] gave the following example:
"Under the single principle of promise keeping, I might make two promises in all good faith and reason that they will not conflict, but then they do, as a result of circumstances that were unpredictable and beyond my control."
Note that there is no conflict at the outset: any dilemma could have been averted by not promising anything. Moreover, there might have been some point in time at which keeping both promises was possible: having 500 $ with me and another 1000 $ in the office, I promise Raoul and Johnny 500 $ each on Saturday with every intention of paying them on Monday, only to find out that the office had been burglarized over the weekend. Donagan [8] argues that this is not a genuine conflict, because three resolving principles apply: (i) one must not make promises one cannot or must not keep, (ii) all promises are made with the implicit condition that they are void if they cannot or must not be kept, (iii) one must not make promises when one does not believe that the other party has fully understood (ii of (DD-) O(A/ ) → P (A/ ) as a logical truth in [48] , von Wright dismisses an inconsistent normative system as 'conceptual absurdity': if A is obligatory on tautological conditions (i.e. unconditionally obligatory), then there cannot be a likewise unconditional obligation to the contrary. Although von Wright originally used the stronger (DD) O(A/C) → P (A/C) for arbitrary C (axiom A1 of the 'old system' in [44] , and axiom B1 of the 'new system' in [46] ), he later turned against it, arguing that while morality makes no conflicting claims, it is not a logical impossibility that conflicting promises can give rise to predicaments.
5
Dyadic operators seem essential for even making this distinction.
6
Turning object language oughts into a special sort of conditionals does not necessarily imply a change in the formalization of the background imperatives: consider the set I = {(¬C ∨A), (¬C ∨¬A)}, corresponding to background imperatives in the usual way. I is also its single maximally consistent subset, which derives ¬C, so O F ¬C and O S ¬C are both true. But a single standard is no longer available once C becomes true: the imperatives have not all been fulfilled (otherwise one would not be in condition C), and any maximal set of imperatives that is consistent with the given circumstances cannot contain all. So the proposal is to call A obligatory in case C iff A is necessary for doing 'the most' that can be achieved, given the truth of C. Formally:
According to this definition, O F (A/C) is true iff there is some set, among the maximal subsets of I consistent with C, that together with C derives A. This is obviously a conservative extension of the definition given for the unconditional case, so we may define
. If a cautious, disjunctive approach were appropriate for cases of conflict, then it would be hard to see why predicaments should be treated differently: that conflicts must be accounted for at the outset, but analogues of Buridan's ass cannot be brought about by fate or unpredictable human nature, would hardly be plausible. Distrusting any single standard, such an approach would accept, given the circumstances C, only what is necessary by any standard that could still be met -no crying over spilled milk. Formally:
According to this definition, O S (A/C) is true iff all the maximal subsets of I consistent with C derive A, given the truth of C. This is again a conservative extension of the unconditional case, so one may define
. After a comparison of the above definitions with similar approaches namely in the study of nonmonotonic reasoning, I will give an axiomatic dyadic deontic system DDL {F,S} , which I prove to be sound and (only) weakly complete with respect to the above semantics.
Comparisons
Though the truth definitions introduced in the preceding section naturally extend the proposals of van Fraassen and Horty for dealing with normative conflicts to the dyadic context and the related problem of predicaments, and though their resolution mechanisms are not exactly new (cf. below), there has not been much discussion of these concepts in the deontic logic literature. Notably, Horty's own dyadic operator in [21] is defined with respect to (simply) maximally nonconflicting sets of prima facie oughts, and it is disregarded that their joint demands may now be inconsistent with the situation. However, the more general literature on nonmonotonic reasoning includes a range of parallel concepts.
Regarding O S , the most obvious parallel is Kratzer and Lewis's premise semantics in [25] and [30] which has a set of formulas H (the premises) to define counterfactuals in much the same way as the set I is used here in the definition of deontic conditionals. Considering Kratzer's definition, and setting aside the world-relativity of H, let S H,C = {H ⊆ H | H BL ¬C} be the set of all subsets of H that are, according to some basic logic BL, consistent with C. Then the counterfactual conditional → is defined in the following way:
In other words, C → A is true iff each set in S H,C has a superset in S H,C that implies C → A. 7 The truth definition is tailored for a basic logic that may fail compactness and so accommodates sets H with ever-larger C-consistent subsets, but no maximal ones. Here, BL was assumed to be compact, and we obtain:
A. Then I ∈ S I,C , and by definition of I⊥¬C there is no other I ∈ S I,C : I ⊆ I , so ∀I ∈ S I,C : if I ⊆ I then I ∪ {C} A, and C → A is false.
Then, the definition of O S parallels that of a consequence relation associated to a Poole system without constraints [35] : This has two sets Γ, ∆ of formulas, the facts and the defaults. A scenario is a set ∆ ∪ Γ such that ∆ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ ∪ Γ BL ⊥. A 'maximal scenario' is one where ∆ ∈ E(Γ ), E(Γ ) being the 7 Lewis's [30] variation requires this property only of non-empty H ∈ S H,C . This corresponds to replacing I ∪ {C} BL A in the truth definition for O S with
produce a regular instead of a normal operator. -Lewis notes (p. 233) that for deontic conditionals, the premises of the premise semantics might be understood to be "something that ought to hold", so he is to be credited for the imperative semantics employed here.
Cn being BL-consequence, a prediction A from the facts Γ and the defaults ∆ is then defined as:
So A is predicted from Γ and ∆ if all maximal scenarios derive A. -Likewise, a 'credulous prediction' can be defined as
(cf. Brass [5] for the analogy and notation). The following is then immediate:
Regarding the O F -operator, it is perhaps not quite as obvious that its corresponding P F -operator is closely related to the 'X-logics' of Siegel and Forget [38] , [10] : The consequence relation | ∼ X of these logics holds between a set of formulas Γ and a formula A modulo a set X of formulas, where the definition is [31] pointed out, X can be understood as a set of 'bad' propositions that one is to avoid. So Γ | ∼ X A is true iff A can be realized together with Γ without increasing the set of 'bad' proposition above those that were already true given Γ . Here we have a set I of 'desired' propositions, so a statement seems 'bad' if it asserts that some desired proposition be false, e.g. ¬A is true for some A ∈ I, or that at least one
} be the 'bad set' corresponding to I. We then obtain: A unified treatment of both, skeptical and credulous consequence can be found in Bochman's 'epistemic states'-semantics in [2] , [3] , [4] . Epistemic states, equivalent to the cumulative models in [26] , are triples E = S, ≺, , where S is a set of objects (belief states), ≺ some asymmetric 'preference' relation on S, and a labeling function that assigns each state s ∈ S a deductively closed theory. min S = {s ∈ S | ∀t ∈ S , t = s : t ⊀ s} is the set of minimal states in S ⊆ S. A = {s ∈ S | ¬A / ∈ (s)} is the set of belief states consistent with A. For each A, A must be ≺-smooth, i.e. for any s ∈ A , either s ∈ min A or there is some t ∈ min A with t ≺ s. With BL as basic logic, Bochman's definitions for skeptical and credulous consequence relations | ∼ and | ≈ are: ∈ I⊥¬A then by definition of I⊥¬A there is some I ∈ I⊥¬A such that I ⊂ I , so there is some I ∈ min A with I ≺ I . So E I is smooth, hence it is an epistemic state. For (c), A = ∅ iff {I ∈ P(I) | I BL ¬A} = ∅ iff ∅ BL ¬A holds by monotony of BL. -Putting together, we get:
and let the corresponding 'epistemic state' E I = S, ≺, be such that (i) S = P(I), (ii) (s) = Cn(s), and (iii) s ≺ t iff t s. Then
A final parallel brings us back to deontic logic, namely the multiplex preference semantics of Goble in [12] , [13] and [14] , where a multitude of preference relations enables definitions like 'all-best' (universally preferred) and 'some-best' (existentially preferred), which are then used in definitions of deontic operators. That, in the finite case, such semantics corresponds closely to the present account will be explicated in sec. 6. Regarding meta-theory, for a somewhat more general semantic setting the skeptical consequence relation was axiomatized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [26] , and the credulous consequence relation by Bochman [2] . However, a completeness proof for a system that includes both 8 seems to be missing so far and this is what I shall now turn to. 8 One might add a third (monadic) deontic modality O 2 that 'more directly talks about the imperatives' to axiomatize consistent agglomeration, but I must leave the details to future study (cf. [17] sec. 6 for the the resulting monadic system DL {2,F,S} ).
The Dyadic Deontic Logic DDL
{F,S}
Let the basic logic be propositional logic PL: The alphabet has proposition letters P rop = {p 1 , p 2 , ...}, operators '¬', '∧', '∨', '→', '↔' and parentheses '(', ')'. The language L P L is defined as usual. , in front of a set of sentences means their conjunction and disjunction, and e.g. A) , B is the set of all such valuations, and A is the extension {v ∈ B | v |= A} of A. PL is a sound and complete axiomatic system, and P L A means that A is provable in PL.
The alphabet of the language L DDL {F,S} additionally has the operators 'O F ', 'O S ', and the auxiliary '/'. DDL {F,S} is then the smallest set such that
Outer parentheses will be mostly omitted. We define P * (A/C) = def ¬O * (¬A/C), where * is F or S. For simplification we do not permit mixed expressions and nested deontic operators like
For DDL {F,S} -semantics, the truth of DDL {F,S} -sentences is defined with respect to a set I ⊆ L P L (Boolean operators being as usual):
Consider the following axiom-schemes ( * is the uniform index F or S): 
Proof. All easy and left to the reader. 
Regarding axioms and theorems, (CExt
Γ is finitely DDL {F,S} -satisfiable: let n be the greatest index of any proposition letter occurring in some finite Γ f ⊆ Γ . Then
For easy verification, I list the relevant sets of maximal subsets: 
(ii) For each A, there is an (p 1 ↔p 2 ) ). From (ii) it follows that
∧p n by observation (ii) and from the fact that
But the conclusions are tautologically equivalent to ¬p 2 , so there are consistent subsets of I that derive ¬p 2 , and 
It then suffices to find a set I ⊆ L P L that makes true all B ∈ ∆.
B: Identifying the deontic bases
We identify syntactically what Hansson called the deontic basis in an extension C (Spohn [39] writes C). Monadic deontic logic has just one basis, dyadic deontic logic usually has one basis for any C, and here there may be several bases, which expresses some conflict or predicament in case C.
where
From (DC S ), (RW * ), and DDL {F,S} -consistency of ∆ we obtain, for any C = ⊥:
Identifying the relevant class of domains
We identify the most general circumstances C A where A is P F -permitted. To the same effect, Spohn employs equivalence classes [A] ≈ defined using (PLoop
D: Identifying the multiple system of spheres
If this were 'ordinary' dyadic deontic logic with agglomeration and so just one basis O C for any C, we would be almost done: like Spohn [39] orders his equivalence classes [C] ≈ by a relation before, C could be ordered into C 1 , ..., C n with C 1 = , and
is then the 'system of spheres'. Here this method fails since no C ∈ C is guaranteed to have a single basis. But as it turns out, C has the structure of a 'multiple' system of spheres that is similarly identified.
{F,S} -inconsistent, but we assumed otherwise. the set of sequences D 1 , ..., D n , 1 ≤ n, where D (C, D) be the set of sequences D 1 , ..., D k , D k+1 , ..., D n , 1 ≤ k < n, where
E: Canonical construction and coincidence lemma
Definition 3 (Canonical Construction). For all C ∈ C ∪ {⊥}, D ∈ r(L δ P L ): -F-Succ(D) = {D ∧ ¬O | O ∈ O F D }, -F-Chain(C) be1 = , D i+1 ∈ F-Succ(D i ), D i = D i+1 for any 1 ≤ i < n, and D n = C, -S-ChainD 1 , ..., D k ∈ F-Chain(C), D i+1 = D i ∧ ¬O S Di , D i = D i+1 for any k ≤ i < n, and D n = D. For any C ∈ C\{⊥}, C ∈ F-Succ(C), let -π : C∪{⊥} → [P rop\L δ P L ] be a
function that associates a unique proposition letter not occurring in δ with each element of
C ∪ {⊥}, -φ(C, C ) = π(C ) ∧ {¬π(C ) | C ∈ F-Succ(C), C = C }, -σ(C) = {¬π(C ) | C ∈ F-Succ(C)}. For any C ∈ C ∪ {⊥} \ { }, C 1 , ..., C n ∈ F-Chain(C), let -i F [ C 1 , ..., C n ] = ¬ C ∧ n−1 i=1 φ(C i , C i+1 ). For any C ∈ C, D 1 , ..., D k , D k+1 , ..., D n ∈ S-Chain(C, D), D k = C, let -i S [ D 1 , ..., D k , D k+1 , ..., D n ] = ¬D ∧ σ(C) ∧ k−1 i=1 φ(C i , C i+1 ) if C = , σ(C) otherwise. Let I F be the set of all such i F [ C 1 , .
.., C n ], and likewise I S be the set of all such
The definition provides the construction of the canonical set I to make all of ∆ true. F-Succ(C) is the set of immediate 'contrary-to-duty' successors C of C, i.e.
∃O ∈ O
F C with C = C ∧ ¬O. (D2) showed each C ∈ C to be such a successor of (a successor of ...) , and F-Chain(C) is the set of all such chains beginning with and ending with C. φ is used to make any two i 
, and ch, ch etc. for any sequence for which either holds. -We obtain: 
Proof. (E1) is immediate from (D4
, a conjunction of conjunctions of non-negated and negated proposition letters, which cannot be a contradiction:
, and no π(C ) occurs negated and non-negated in φ(C i , C i+1 ). D) ], the case that π(C ) occurs nonnegated in φ(C i , C i+1 ) and negated in σ(C) is done like the second case above.
Proof. (E6) is immediate from (E2-4) and finiteness of
x by (E1) and hence that of any
So there is no designated member of I , so by
, so by (DN-R F ) B = ⊥ and I⊥¬B = ∅, completing the r.a.a.
Coincidence for O S :
Right-to-Left: Assume O S (A/B) ∈ ∆ and for r.a.a. suppose that there is some I ∈ I⊥¬B, : I ∪ {B} P L A. Assume I = ∅, so let i x be the designated member of I , and ¬D its r(L 
A Link to Multiplex Preference Semantics
In the preceding section, the completeness theorem was proved by identifying a multiple system of spheres. This multiple system of spheres can just as well be used to construct a multitude of preference relations, which -as originated with Goble [13] , [14] -can then in turn be used to define the deontic operators: let P be a non-empty set of preference relations P ⊆ B × B such that each P is transitive, connected, and satisfies the 'limit assumption' :
, and let the truth definitions for the deontic operators read:
S , and the truth definitions now read: are sound (cf. [14] , also Arrow's axiom: Let F-Chain(⊥), S-Chain(C, ⊥), be defined as before, C ∈ C. We only consider
(S1) and (S2) are immediate from (E1) and the definition of ch. n is finite (S3) since r(L δ P L ) is finite and repetitions in ch are excluded. For (S4),
By (S2) and (S4), each v must belong to exactly one sphere. The index of each C i is transitive and connected, so P ch is as well. LA holds due to (S3) and (S4).
We then obtain, for any ch and A = ⊥:
Proof. (S5) is immediate from (S1), (S4) and Finally, let
So P is as required. The next lemma holds for all A ∈ r(L δ P L ), A = ⊥ and P ∈ P and saves us from having to do separate proofs for the two systems:
Suppose v P v for some v ∈ A ∧ ¬B : so v ∈ A and v ∈ best P ( A ) by transitivity of P and definition of best. But then best P ( A ) ∩ ¬B = ∅, contradicting the assumption. Assume ∃v ∈ A ∧ B ) : ∀v ∈ A ∧ ¬B : not v P v, and for r.a.a. suppose that best P ( A ) ∩ ¬B = ∅: So ∃v ∈ best P ( A ) ∩ ¬B . Then v ∈ A ∧ ¬B by definition of best, and not v P v, as assumed. But v ∈ A ∧ B , so v ∈ A , so since v ∈ best P ( A ) we have v P v by definition of best, which completes the r.a.a.
Lemma 2 (Coincidence Lemma). For all
. Also, if B = ⊥, then for any P ∈ P, best P ( B ) = ∅. P = ∅, so ∃P ∈ P : best P ( B ) ⊆ A holds for any A, and both sides of the iff-clause are true, and so is the iff-clause. -In the case of DDL
, and so by definition of ∆, O F (A/⊥) / ∈ ∆. Also, if B = ⊥, then A ∧ B = ∅, so for any P it is false that there is some v ∈ A ∧ B such that ∀v ∈ A ∧ ¬B : not v P v. So both sides of the iff-clause are false, and the iff-clause true. 
Left-to-right:
, and so with (FH+ SSF ) we obtain
Coincidence for O S :
. Also, if B = ⊥, then for any P ∈ P, best P ( B ) = ∅, so for all P ∈ P : best P ( B ) ⊆ A holds for any A, and both sides of the iff-clause are true, as is the iff-clause. -In the case of DDL
, and by definition of ∆, O S (A/⊥) / ∈ ∆. Also, if B = ⊥, then A ∧ B = ∅, and since P = ∅ there is some P for which it is false that ∃v ∈ A ∧ B : ∀v ∈ A ∧ ¬B : not v P v, so it is not true for all P . So both sides of the iff-clause are false, and the clause true. 
The Puzzle Is Still Incomplete
From a complete picture of dyadic deontic reasoning about conflicting imperatives, at least two pieces are still missing. The first is that an imperative itself may be conditional in a way irreducible to a material implication in its content: e.g. if I'm to throw rice as the wedding party leaves the church, but Huey, Dewey and Louie have stolen the bag, blocking the doors won't garner me any praise. It has been argued that such conditional imperatives have two associated propositions, the antecedent and the consequent, and that obligations are only 'triggered', if the antecedents hold, thus providing the opportunity for norm satisfaction or violation. Secondly, even though weighing out the relevant factors may not always produce an unequivocal result, imperatives can be ordered by rank of the issuing authority or normative weight: e.g. finding the victim of an accident on my way to a crucial appointment, it seems clear what my obligations are and to not be the time for skeptical or credulous reasoning.
In an attempt to tackle these complexities, Horty [21] proposed the following definition of the imperatives 'binding' in some circumstances A: is the unconditional imperative ⇒ (¬A ∧ B), and the sequence represents the ordering <. Though we do not know which imperative overrides the weakest imperative !(¬A ∧ B), we know for sure that it is overridden in these circumstances and so should not be included in Binding (I ,<) (C ∨ D), but with Horty's definition it is. I suggest that, for a better definition of the set Triggered I (C ∨ D), we need an operation like Makinson and van der Torre's [32] 'basic output', which is expressly tailored to process such disjunctive inputs (triggering conditions) intelligibly. But directly applying their construction seems difficult, since it would also close the set of the relevant imperatives' consequents under consequences, and this is hardly an option when conflicts are allowed.
Secondly, the inconsistency check seems both too rigid and not rigid enough. For the latter, let I 1 = !(A∧¬B), !(B∧C) and I 2 = !((A∧¬B)∨D), !¬D, !(B∧ C) : in both cases more important imperatives are in conflict with the weakest, but it is rejected only in the first. For the former, let I = C ⇒ ¬D, C ⇒ (B ∧ D) and the situation be (C ∧ D). C ⇒ (B ∧ D) is not in Binding (I ,<) (C ∧ D), its consequent contradicting that of a more important imperative. But this has become unfulfillable, which intuitively clears the way for obligatoriness of B. For a solution, I propose to leave inconsistency checks entirely to the (credulous or skeptical) reasoning strategy defined via sets consistent with the circumstances C: let each of these include a maximally C-consistent subset of the most important triggered imperatives' consequents, a maximal subset of the second most important triggered imperatives' consequents that can be C-consistently added to the former, etc. This is the incremental maximizing employed for belief revision by Brewka [6] and Nebel [34] (to work, < must be well-founded). Drawing on a parallel result by Rott ([37] th. 7), my conjecture is that as long as conflicts between incomparable or equally important imperatives are allowed, the logic for accordingly defined deontic operators will still be DDL {F,S} .
